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Abstract
The high cost of access to space is driven in part by a cost spiral -- higher costs lead to fewer missions
which leads to a demand for higher reliability which leads to higher costs. One way to potentially break this
cycle is to introduce the opportunity for rapid, low-cost experiments leading to a larger number of near term
experiments which, in turn, should result in higher performance, greater reliability, and lower cost systems
which will spur the demand for additional rapid, low-cost experiments. A program has been initiated to
help bring this about, initially with suborbital flights and subsequently with orbital flights of small
experiments and instruments. The first FAST experiment was flown on board a Scorpius SR-XM suborbital
vehicle launched from White Sands Missile Range on March 9, 2001.
we would like to address is the issue of space
testing. One way to start the process of breaking
the cycle is shown in Fig. 2. If we can begin to
create an environment of rapid, low-cost
experiments, there will be more space
experiments and shorter schedules. This, in turn
leads to higher performance, higher reliability,
lower cost systems and additional rapid, low-cost
testing. If experiments at the component, box, or
assembly level can be done cheaply and quickly,
then it is reasonable to accept some level of
failure.
Experiments can be just that -experiments. A failure can lead to improved
understanding and a subsequent success in the
near future

Background
Why does space cost so much? There is no
single, simple answer, of course. As shown in
Fig. 1, Sellers and Milton [1996], among others,
have suggested that much of the problem is due
to a cycle of higher costs leading to fewer
missions leading to demands for higher reliability
leading to longer schedules and higher costs.
Because space is remarkably expensive,
everything must work the first time. The mantra
of "faster, better, cheaper" has led to significant
progress, but has not yet created the major
breakthroughs that are needed. If space is to be
accessible, then dramatic reduction in cost and
schedule are required. One element of this that

*
†
‡

copyright 2001, Microcosm, Inc.
E-mail addresses: jwertz@smad.com, rconger@smad.com, and ggurevich@smad.com
E-mail address: jkulpa@scorpius.com
1

James R. Wertz

15th Annual AIAA/USU Conference
on Small Satellites

Fig. 1. The Fundamental Problem of Space Mission Development.
(from Sellers and Milton [1996])

Envision a world where space testing is so
accessible that no one even thinks about it.
Equipment and small experiments are built and
flown within a few weeks or months of the time
they are completed. Data from the experiment is
immediately available. You can refly your
experiment within a few weeks or months if it
doesn't work, or, alternatively, if it works but the
results show you a way to make it work better.
Of course, the flight and reflight must be
available on reasonably short notice and at low
cost.

The Advantages of Fast,
Low-Cost Space Testing
What are the advantages of rapid-access, lowcost space testing? An important issue is that it
allows development testing in space, not just a
final proof-of-concept. This can be critical for
risk reduction and for developing break-through
technologies. The best way to reduce risk during
development is via extensive testing, but many
products -- such as heat pipes, deployment
mechanisms, 0-g equipment, and nearly all types
of sensors and actuators -- need at least some
testing in the space environment. If this testing
occurs early in the development cycle, we will
quickly learn what works and what doesn't and
find ways to minimize both cost and risk.
Similarly, it's difficult to justify spending years
and large amounts of money on a potential breakthrough technology that might not work as
intended. Demonstrating quickly and at low

This process is effectively impossible within
the current space development and testing
environment. Even simple tests take several
years to develop and fly. However, we believe
that with relatively small steps we can make the
above possible and, in the process, significantly
change the way we do business in space.

Fig. 2. What Can Be Done to Break the Cost Growth Spiral.
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government-sponsored
small
launcher
development program. The Bantam program has
gone away and has not been replaced. There is
insufficient pressure, in terms of identified need,
to warrant a government low-cost small launcher
program.

cost that the basic idea works or doesn't work can
give impetus to the development or change the
direction of the work.
Continuously availability means that
experiments can fly when they're ready. The
experimenter can choose between a quick flight
on a non-ideal orbit or trajectory or take a later
flight to a more appropriate orbit, or do both.
Experiment development can move faster, and,
therefore, cost less.

Nonetheless, the need for small, low-cost
launch is real.
Payload instruments are
continually shrinking in size. Many advanced
mission concepts revolve around constellations
or formations of small satellites. Even though a
formation or cluster of satellites could be orbited
by using one or two large launch vehicles,
replacement launches are required to create an
operationally viable system. Using launches at
$15 million to $25 million for smallsat
replacement is unacceptably expensive. A large
number of experimental and university satellites
need rides.

A fast, low-cost, space test program will
save dollar amounts that are individually small
relative to space programs costing $100's of
millions or billions. Nonetheless, a new way of
doing business could represent dramatic, longterm cost savings over more traditional
approaches. The principal reasons for this are:
• Rapid turn-around testing allows space
hardware development on a much shorter
time scale
• Shorter schedules save money
• Allows us to truly experiment and try new,
innovative ideas
• Can break (or at least severely dent) the
"not allowed to fail" syndrome

We believe that this is a classic "chickenand-egg" problem. No program can be formally
initiated that requires a low-cost small launch
vehicle, because none exists. It is an exercise in
futility to begin a program based on a technology
that doesn't exist and that isn't in the realm of
expertise of the experimenters. But because
there are no programs that will say they can not
survive without a small, low-cost launcher, the
government will conclude that there is no
demand. This lack of demand will keep the
government from perceiving that a need
genuinely exists and, therefore, will keep a
development program from occurring.

The Lack of Demand
for Low-Cost Launch
Many of us in the smallsat community
believe that a key to making space affordable is
accessible, flexible, low-cost launch. At the
present time, small low-cost launcher
development is largely stalled for lack of
funding. This comes about for several reasons.
First, there is insufficient identified commercial
demand to justify development using commercial
funding. Beal Aerospace, a fully commercial
venture, focused exclusively on developing a
medium-lift GTO launcher.
Most business
projections show that is where most of the
identifiable business base is. In spite of a strong
desire to do so, Microcosm has been unable to
identify sufficient firm market potential to justify
commercial funding for the low-cost launch
segment. Many of the start-up launch vehicle
businesses from recent years no longer exist. In
addition, secondary rides on EELV or other new
vehicles will have substantial constraints, will be
limited in number, and may not occur at all.

While substantial progress has been made,
the cost of launch has not changed dramatically
in 30 years. (See, for example, Koelle, 1999].)
This has been identified by many authors and
committees as the fundamental problem for space
system growth.
However, the government
believes this only in the sense of an abstract
future need, not a real and present need, because
of the lack of identified demand.
We as a community can accept the
inevitability of high launch costs for small
payloads or try to find ways within our capacity
to address the issue. Microcosm would like to
take a proactive position by offering both
suborbital, and eventually orbital, rides to as
many small instruments as possible. We have
several specific objectives for doing so:

At this time, both DoD and NASA believe
that there is insufficient demand to justify a
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orbital or suborbital launch over the next several
years. [Wertz, et al., 1995, 1996; Berry, et al.,

• Make use of space and mass margin
available on virtually all flights to satisfy
what we believe, but can not prove, is a
potentially large demand.
• Establish that a demand exists, or prove
that it does not exist, and obtain
quantifiable data on the need for low-cost
launch.
• Begin changing the process of how space
hardware gets developed and tested by
tilting that process toward more low-cost,
rapid-turn-around testing.
• Begin the process of changing the
paradigm by which business is done in
space in favor of more small payloads
and small satellites.

1999a, 1999b] At present, flights are suborbital
and spaced more than a year apart. However, we
hope to be launching orbital flights and much
more frequent suborbitals within a few years. As
the program matures we would like to be able to
launch small equipment within weeks after it's
ready to go. A nominal flight schedule for the
next several years is shown in Fig. 3. Of course,
this schedule is dependent on funding, which is
by no means assured.
The FAST small experiment program was
initiated on the first flight of the SR-XM, which
occurred on March 9, 2001, at the White Sands
Missile Range, NM. This flight flew a selfcontained
TRW/DARPA
nanothruster
experiment. The TRW experiment is shown in
Fig. 4 and the SR-XM launch in Fig. 5.

The FAST Small
Experiment Program
Microcosm and its commercial partner, the
Scorpius Space Launch Company, will provide
flight opportunities for small equipment for
testing or experimentation on every Scorpius®

Fig. 3. Tentative Near-Schedule of Scorpius Flights
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Fig. 4. The TRW Nanothruster Experiment flown on the SR-XM.

®

Fig. 5. Launch of the Scorpius XR-XM from
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White Sands Missle Range on March 9, 2001.

• Can test all of the processes, data flow,
and environmental conditions at very low
cost

The details of the basic suborbital and
orbital service are still in the process of being
defined. A preliminary definition of the basic
suborbital package is as follows:

We recommend using suborbital flights to
find problems, look for solutions, and experiment
with new approaches. Suborbital flights should
be regarded as a low-cost pathfinder for later
orbital flights. They should be used for true
experimentation and engineering development.

• Up to 8 experiments per flight
• Up to 15 kg per experiment
• Up to 1 amp @ 28 V = 28 W for the entire
flight (all experiments)
• Up to 60 kilobits downlink (all
experiments)

The Cost of FAST
The basic services package will be provided
to the experimenter at no cost, i.e., free. (The
FAST acronym stands for Free Access to Space
Testing.) Additional services will be made as
low cost as possible. While we can not fully
determine what that will be, we anticipate, for
example, that an additional 200 W for the
suborbital flights will cost approximately $2000.

All experiments will fly on a space available
basis. We will try to define a standard "block" of
services that will maximize utility and minimize
cost. Additional services over and above the
standard service will be available at a nominal
cost.
This would include, for example,
additional power, or a CCD color camera and
independent video transmitter. Orbital flight
accommodations are expected to be similar, but
may be more limited in terms of weight and
power.

Of course, we all understand that there is no
free launch. What we need in exchange for the
"free" ride is the following:

The types of flights available, in order of
increasing cost and longer schedule, are:
•
•
•
•

• Formal acknowledgement of Microcosm
and Scorpius Space Launch Company in
all final reports, press releases,
professional papers, and similar public
statements
• Support (letters, discussions, meetings, or
whatever) on the need for low-cost
access to space for small payloads and
experiments
• Quantitative estimate of the number and
types of payloads that your organization
would attempt to fly if low cost orbital
launch was available for small payloads
• Quantitative details on your equipment or
experiment

Low suborbital
High suborbital
Low Earth orbit
Radiation belt or higher Earth orbit

Initially, FAST experiments are based on
captive instruments. Free-flier payloads may be
considered at a later date. Our fundamental
objective is to fly every small experiment in
space (suborbital or orbital) that wants to fly.
We would encourage potential experimenters to
consider the benefit of near-term suborbital
flights. Although initial flights will be further
apart, creating a testing environment with flights
on a monthly basis is potentially realizable in the
future. Some of the substantial advantages of
suborbital testing are:

–
–

•
•
•
•

Flights much more frequent that orbital
Integration can be much less arduous
Data recovery is immediate
Physical recovery is possible at far less
cost than orbital flight
• Rapid reflight is possible
• Can provide many of the fundamental
characteristics of orbital flight

• Your organizational agreement that we can
use this summary data in discussions of
space testing applications
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2003 or 2004. This date is, of course, strongly
funding dependent.

Fundamentally, what we want in exchange for a
"free ride" is your active cooperation in defining
the need for low-cost launch and helping us
create genuine low-cost access to space and,
hopefully, interest in procuring one of our
vehicles in the future.
Conclusion -- Why FAST

We expect to fly small instruments for free
on all, or nearly all, Scorpius® suborbital and
orbital launches. We can do this for hundreds of
small instruments. We would like to work with
programs and organizations that have a strong
interest in helping to change the way space
business gets done to the benefit of both industry
and the government.

Our marketing group believes that we are
fundamentally crazy -- "You get what you pay
for; if you give it away, we get no revenue and
people will perceive it as having no value." Why
would we choose to give away that which we
could potentially sell? There are a number of
reasons:

We are Very Interested in Hearing Your
Opinion, Flying Your Equipment,
and Getting Your Help
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